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IT IS EMPHATICALLY THE PROVINCE 
AND DUTY OF STATE COURTS TO SAY 
WHAT TORT LAW IS 
Sijin Choi* 
 
Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in PLIVA, Inc. v. 
Mensing, consumers of generic prescription drugs suffering from unwarned-
of side effects largely remain without an avenue of legal recourse due to their 
inability to sue their own manufacturers.  But in the pursuit for legal redress, 
some generic plaintiffs have pursued a narrow window of liability by 
bringing failure-to-warn claims, sounding in negligence, against the 
manufacturer responsible for producing the brand-name equivalent of the 
generic drug.  Such claims rest on the rationale that the sui generis federal 
regulatory scheme governing the prescription drug industry furnishes an 
inextricable nexus between the brand-name manufacturer and generic-drug 
user such that it generates a negligence duty of care between them. 
The case law on this duty question remains fractured.  Until late 2017, the 
majority of courts confronting the duty issue ruled for the brand-name 
defendant and held no duty as a matter of law.  However, beginning in 
December of 2017, two landmark decisions by the California and 
Massachusetts supreme courts, in support of duty, have called for a 
reexamination of settled case law and, accordingly, given new hope to the 
generic-drug user’s pursuit of legal remedy. 
In light of these recent developments, this Note seeks to equip future courts 
confronting the duty question with a functional understanding of the 
considerations that lie on both sides of the duty inquiry.  In addition, this 
Note proposes a remedial position that incorporates both the policy concerns 
cutting against duty and the doctrinal considerations undergirding it.  At its 
core, this Note argues that doctrine demands a duty be recognized and, 
further, that courts have the core institutional competence to craft tort law in 
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ways that will avert ruinous public policy consequences.  In making this 
argument, this Note conveys a fighting message to courts:  where tort 
doctrine says a duty of care exists, courts should endeavor to give effect to 
that duty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is a settled expectation under modern norms that where a product’s 
defect causes physical injury to its user, that user has a remedy at law.  
Indeed, perhaps the telltale sign of this settled expectation is the crown jewel 
of consumer protection law:  the imposition of strict liability on 
manufacturers for their products’ defects.1  Yet, despite this ubiquitous 
modern understanding, consumer relief remains unrealized for users2 of 
generic-version prescription drugs3 who suffer from unwarned-of and 
injurious side effects.  Though generic users’ injuries plainly arise out of a 
product defect—the generic drug’s deficient warning label—tort law 
nevertheless shuts them out from pursuing any legal recourse. 
This current lack of legal redress for generic users traces its roots to the 
2011 U.S. Supreme Court case, PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing.4  In PLIVA, the 
Court held that federal warning-label law “preempts” state tort failure-to-
warn claims brought against generic manufacturers.5  The Court reached this 
conclusion after interpreting federal law to prohibit generic manufacturers 
from unilaterally strengthening their own warning labels and, instead, only 
obligating them to replicate the warnings of their brand-name counterparts.6  
Thus, the Court held that preemption was triggered under the Supremacy 
Clause because it was impossible for generic manufacturers to comply with 
state tort warning-label obligations while also heeding federal law’s 
prohibition on unilateral strengthening.7 
 
 1. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 461–62 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., 
concurring) (pioneering strict products liability). 
 2. Users of generic drugs will hereinafter be referred to as “generic users” or “generic 
plaintiffs.” 
 3. Prescription drugs come in two forms:  brand name and generic.  The brand-name 
manufacturer is the first mover in the market who invests in research and development and 
subsequently brings a newly developed drug to market. See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 
S. Ct. 2466, 2470 (2013).  This newly innovated drug is the “brand-name drug.” See id.  In 
contrast, generic manufacturers create a product—the “generic drug”—that replicates an 
existing brand-name drug. See id.  The generic drug is virtually a carbon copy of the brand-
name equivalent drug and is introduced into the market once the brand-name drug’s 
exclusivity period expires. See id. 
 4. 564 U.S. 604 (2011). 
 5. Id. at 617–18.  A generic prescription drug manufacturer will hereinafter be referred 
to as a “generic manufacturer” or simply a “generic.” 
 6. Id. at 613; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v) (2012) (codifying the requirement that 
warning labels of generic drugs be the same as their brand-name counterparts).  Brand-name 
prescription drug manufacturers will hereinafter be referred to as “brand-name 
manufacturers.”  Brand-name drug consumers will hereinafter be referred to as “brand-name 
users.” 
 7. PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 617–18. 
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Today, as a consequence of PLIVA, generic users suffering from 
unwarned-of side effects are shut out from suing their own manufacturers for 
failure to warn of injurious side effects.8  This shut-out effect has, however, 
inspired a new form of tort litigation in which generic plaintiffs have sued 
the manufacturer responsible for creating the brand-name equivalent of their 
injury-causing drug.9  These suits allege negligent failure to warn, not strict 
products liability, as the cause of action against the brand-name defendant10 
and rest on the core contention that brand names owe generic users a duty to 
warn of adverse side effects because of PLIVA’s obligation of warning-label 
sameness.11  Accordingly, the crucial issue predominating the case law today 
is whether generic users are owed a duty of care by brand-name 
manufacturers in promulgating adequate warning labels.12 
Courts appear sharply divided on this duty question.  Until recently, the 
vast majority of courts confronted with generic users’ failure-to-warn claims 
ruled for the brand-name manufacturer and held no duty as a matter of law.13  
However, beginning in December of 2017, two landmark decisions by the 
California and Massachusetts supreme courts, in favor of duty,14 have 
reinvigorated the generic plaintiff’s cause and, more notably, marked a key 
development in prescription drug jurisprudence.  Now, with the arrival of 
these two decisions, it is likely that courts across the country will be asked to 
reconsider generic users’ failure-to-warn claims brought against brand-name 
manufacturers. 
The sharp divide in the case law regarding duty is entirely plausible.15  
Inherent in this difficult duty question are complex and interrelated 
considerations that provide a smattering of doctrine, public policy, history, 
fairness, and, more profoundly, the metaphysical role of duty in tort law.16  
Crucially, how courts view generic users’ negligence claims is often 
dispositive of how they will come out on the duty question:  if causation or 
 
 8. See id. at 643 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 9. See, e.g., Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 1994); Kellogg v. 
Wyeth, 762 F. Supp. 2d 694 (D. Vt. 2010); T.H. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 407 P.3d 18 (Cal. 
2017); Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299 (Ct. App. 2008); Rafferty v. Merck & Co., 
92 N.E.3d 1205 (Mass. 2018). 
 10. Flynn v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 627 N.W.2d 342 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); Franzman 
v. Wyeth, Inc., 451 S.W.3d 676 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014); Silva v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., No. 
31,276, 2013 WL 4516160 (N.M. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2013); Weese v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 
153742/12, 2013 WL 5691993 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 8, 2013); McNair v. Johnson & Johnson, 
818 S.E.2d 852 (W. Va. 2018). 
 11. See infra Part III.A. 
 12. See John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the 
Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 658–59 (2001) (surveying the laws 
of fifty jurisdictions and concluding that every state, except two, retains duty as a prima facie 
element of negligence).  In negligence suits, the duty element is a question of law for the court 
to decide in the first instance. See 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 78 (2018) (surveying tort 
law across the country).  Failure to prove the duty element will thus prevent the negligence 
case from proceeding to trial. See id. 
 13. See infra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 14. Novartis, 407 P.3d at 18; Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1205. 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
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public policy is used as a proxy for duty, then indeed, there is no cause of 
action because the generic user did not ingest the brand name’s product and 
imposing duty presents serious policy risks;17 but if duty is analyzed using 
traditional doctrinal considerations—such as reasonable foreseeability—the 
case for duty grows much stronger.18 
Against this backdrop, this Note argues that there is a way for courts to 
recognize a duty of care while maintaining fidelity to both the public policy 
and doctrinal justifications that lie at the crux of the duty question.19  This 
remedial approach, which is discussed extensively in Part IV, rests on two 
fundamental planks:  first, history and the distinctive features of the brand-
name, generic-user relationship generate a duty of care, and second, courts 
have the core institutional competence to craft tort law in ways that will avert 
the relevant public policy concerns.  Put simply, this Note sets forth a judicial 
solution that will allow courts to achieve a win-win situation by recognizing 
duty. 
This Note is organized into four Parts.  Part I examines the development 
of failure-to-warn jurisprudence in the prescription drug context by 
examining two landmark Supreme Court decisions, Wyeth v. Levine20 and 
PLIVA.  Part II analyzes the key implications of PLIVA on prescription drug 
jurisprudence and subsequently looks at the current state of affairs through 
an in-depth discussion of four emblematic cases on the duty question.  Part 
III then isolates the key arguments found in the case law underlying each side 
of the duty inquiry.  Finally, Part IV argues for the recognition of a duty of 
care using a remedial duty framework that encapsulates both the doctrinal 
and public policy rationales at stake.  A brief Addendum at the end of this 
Note addresses the Court's recent opinion in Air & Liquid Systems Corp. v. 
DeVries.21  This decision, despite being a maritime law case, is included 
because it provides reasoning that further substantiates the position this Note 
advances. 
At bottom, this Note seeks to equip future courts confronting the duty 
question with a functional understanding of the considerations coloring the 
duty discussion while also delivering its own core message:  where tort 
doctrine tells us there is a duty, yet public policy considerations stand in the 
way, courts should endeavor to give effect to that duty. 
I.  RETRACING THE CASE LAW’S FOOTSTEPS 
Since the advent of products liability law for prescription drugs, it was 
widely assumed that a prescription drug manufacturer’s duty to warn of 
harmful side effects progressed along two parallel tracks:  state tort law and 
 
 17. See infra Part III.A. 
 18. See infra Part III.A. 
 19. See infra Part IV. 
 20. 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
 21. No. 17-1104 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2019). 
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the federal regulatory scheme.22  Ostensibly, these two bodies of law were 
understood to coexist and operate in distinct spheres of influence.23  
Beginning in 2009, however, this long-held understanding came under attack 
as efforts intensified in forcing a collision between state and federal law.24  
In 2011, those efforts bore fruit and culminated in a direct collision.25 
A.  Wyeth:  A False Alarm 
In Wyeth v. Levine, plaintiff Diane Levine developed gangrene after 
ingesting the brand-name drug Phenergan.26  Shortly thereafter, Levine sued 
Phenergan’s manufacturer, Wyeth, claiming that under Vermont tort law, 
Wyeth was liable for her injuries because it had failed to include the risk of 
gangrene on Phenergan’s warning label.27  At first blush, Levine’s suit 
seemed to be a standard failure-to-warn products liability claim brought by 
an injured consumer against her product’s manufacturer.28  Wyeth, however, 
defended with a novel argument:  because Phenergan’s warning label had 
been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) pursuant to 
federal regulations, federal law preempted Levine’s state tort claims alleging 
failure to warn.29  In essence, Wyeth’s position claimed that federal warning-
label law had collided with state tort law, and thus, the latter had to give 
way.30  Suddenly, what had historically been viewed as two conceptually 
distinct bodies of law were now being pitted directly against one another in 
the shadow of the Supremacy Clause.31 
Wyeth’s suspected collision, however, turned out to be a false alarm.32  The 
Court, in a 6-3 decision, distinguished state tort law from the FDA’s 
prescription drug warning-label obligations and declined to find 
preemption.33  To reach this decision, the Court reasoned that federal law sets 
the floor on the level of warning-label obligations drug manufacturers owe 
to their consumers, not the ceiling.34  Accordingly, state tort law could 
impose supplementary warning-label obligations that were otherwise lacking 
under federal law.35  Wyeth thus reaffirmed the customary understanding that 
state tort law and federal law compelled separate warning-label obligations 
that run on parallel tracks. 
 
 22. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 634 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(examining the history of state and federal regulation of the prescription drug industry). 
 23. See id. 
 24. See generally Wyeth, 555 U.S. 555. 
 25. See PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 634 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 26. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 558–60. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See id. 
 29. Id. at 580–81. 
 30. See id. at 581. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See id. at 572. 
 33. Id. at 573. 
 34. Id. at 575. 
 35. Id. at 572. 
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B.  PLIVA:  The Collision 
Just one year after deciding Wyeth, the Court granted certiorari on another 
potential collision case:  PLIVA.  Like Diane Levine in Wyeth, the plaintiffs 
in PLIVA also suffered a serious side effect—tardive dyskinesia—after 
ingesting the prescription drug metoclopramide.36  Seeking damages for their 
injuries, the plaintiffs brought state tort claims against metoclopramide’s 
manufacturer for its failure to warn of the paralyzing disease.37  In response 
to the plaintiffs’ claims, the defendant-manufacturer argued federal 
preemption, which proceeded on a similar theory to that of the preemption 
defense in Wyeth.38  As before, the defense was steering the failure-to-warn 
litigation toward a collision between federal and state law. 
This time, however, the Court saw things differently and distinguished 
Wyeth on the preemption question.39  To the Court, PLIVA did, in fact, trigger 
preemption because the defendant happened to be a generic manufacturer and 
not a brand-name manufacturer, which had been the case in Wyeth.40  The 
Court held that this pivotal distinction—brand name versus generic—created 
fundamentally discrepant warning-label obligations under federal law that 
dictated the disposition of the preemption issue:  while brand-name 
manufacturers were under a duty to continuously monitor and warn of newly 
discovered side effects, generic manufacturers were simply obligated to 
maintain a warning label that replicated the brand name’s label.41  
Furthermore, the Court granted deference to the FDA’s views, as espoused 
in an amicus brief, and found that generic manufacturers were prohibited 
under federal law from unilaterally strengthening their own warning labels.42  
Thus, because generic manufacturers could not unilaterally strengthen their 
own warnings labels, the Court held preemption was triggered because the 
plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims sought to impose warning-label obligations 
on the generic defendant that federal law expressly prohibited it from 
discharging.43 
II.  THE CASE LAW TODAY 
As stated before, the Court’s decision in PLIVA has set the stage for 
modern prescription drug jurisprudence.  Most notably, in an effort to 
circumvent preemption, generic users have pursued a narrow window of 
liability by bringing negligence suits alleging failure to warn against brand-
 
 36. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 609 (2011). 
 37. Id. at 610. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See id. at 624. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.  It is important to remember that failure-to-warn claims brought against brand-
name manufacturers are not preempted because brand names can unilaterally strengthen their 
prescription drug warning labels. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 572–73 (2009). 
 43. See PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 617–18. 
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name manufacturers.44  As a threshold matter, generic plaintiffs must first 
establish the duty element under negligence law if their claims are to survive 
summary judgment.  Accordingly, how courts come out on the duty element 
is crucial to determining the viability of generic users’ claims and, more 
fundamentally, their ability to collect damages.45 
This Part picks up where PLIVA left off by analyzing PLIVA’s key legal 
effects on failure-to-warn jurisprudence.  This Part then builds toward the 
threshold duty issue underlying generic users’ failure-to-warn claims and 
surveys the national landscape of past decisions that have addressed this duty 
question.  Finally, this Part details four emblematic cases on the duty question 
decided by the highest courts of California, Iowa, Massachusetts, and West 
Virginia.46 
A.  The National Landscape 
PLIVA has produced an anomalous pocket of tort law where generic users 
who suffer from unwarned-of and injurious side effects are left without an 
avenue of legal recourse against the manufacturers of their generic drugs.47  
Yet, litigation over the prescription drug industry’s warning-label obligations 
continues albeit in a different context48:  generic plaintiffs have homed in on 
a new target by bringing failure-to-warn claims, sounding in negligence, 
against the brand-name manufacturer responsible for creating their drug’s 
brand-name equivalent.49  Pursuant to Wyeth, such claims are not preempted 
because, unlike generic manufacturers, brand-name manufacturers can 
unilaterally strengthen their own warning labels.50  Putting aside preemption, 
then, the crucial legal issue that is now the locus of failure-to-warn litigation 
is whether brand-name manufacturers owe a duty to generic users to 
adequately warn of a drug’s adverse side effects.  Indeed, this duty question 
remains hotly contested due, in substantial part, to the salient fact that generic 
users have neither bought nor directly ingested the brand-name product.51  
Thus, the duty question can be condensed and rephrased:  Can a brand-name 
 
 44. See, e.g., T.H. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 407 P.3d 18 (Cal. 2017); Rafferty v. Merck 
& Co., 92 N.E.3d 1205 (Mass. 2018). 
 45. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 46. There are many well-reasoned cases addressing the duty question.  This Note, 
however, has selected the California, Iowa, Massachusetts, and West Virginia decisions for 
further discussion because of their recency and their status as binding authoritative precedent 
in their respective states. 
 47. See PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 643 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 48. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Warning:  Shifting Liability to Manufacturers of Brand-
Name Medicines When the Harm Was Allegedly Caused by Generic Drugs Has Severe Side 
Effects, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1835, 1837 (2013). 
 49. See, e.g., Novartis, 407 P.3d at 18; Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1205. 
 50. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 572–73 (2009). 
 51. See, e.g., Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 169–70 (4th Cir. 1994) 
(holding that there was no duty of care owed due to a lack of privity); Couick v. Wyeth, Inc., 
691 F. Supp. 2d 643, 645 (W.D.N.C. 2010) (concluding that no duty of care existed because 
the generic plaintiff did not ingest the brand-name drug); Stoddard v. Wyeth, Inc., 630 F. 
Supp. 2d 631, 634 (E.D.N.C. 2009) (holding that no duty of care existed due to lack of 
causation). 
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manufacturer be held to owe a duty of care to consumers of its competitor’s 
product?52 
Courts are deeply divided on this duty question.  Until December 2017, 
the case law on the duty question remained lopsided:  a majority of courts 
addressing the issue had sided with the brand-name manufacturer and held 
that no duty existed as a matter of law.53  Reflecting this majority position, 
two state supreme courts—Iowa54 and West Virginia55—made the no duty 
position the law of the land in their respective states.56  Conversely, courts 
recognizing a duty of care seemed firmly entrenched in the minority camp.57  
However, two recent state supreme court decisions—from California and 
Massachusetts—may indicate a resurgence of the minority position. 
B.  The Minority Position:  California and Massachusetts 
In late 2017, the Supreme Court of California in T.H. v. Novartis 
Pharmaceuticals Corp.58 held that the brand-name manufacturer, Novartis, 
 
 52. Some have referred to this form of liability as “competitor liability” or “innovator 
liability.” See generally Schwartz et al., supra note 48 (using the phrase “competitor 
liability”); Wesley E. Weeks, Picking Up the Tab for Your Competitors:  Innovator Liability 
After PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1257 (2012) (using the phrase 
“innovator liability”). 
 53. See, e.g., In re Darvocet, Darvon, & Propoxyphene Prods. Liab. Litig., 756 F.3d 917, 
939 (6th Cir. 2014); Moretti v. Wyeth, Inc., 579 F. App’x 563, 565 (9th Cir. 2014); Lashley 
v. Pfizer, Inc., 750 F.3d 470, 478 (5th Cir. 2014); Strayhorn v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 737 F.3d 
378, 406 (6th Cir. 2013); Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 727 F.3d 1273, 1290 (10th Cir. 2013); 
Guarino v. Wyeth, LLC, 719 F.3d 1245, 1253 (11th Cir. 2013); Bell v. Pfizer, Inc., 716 F.3d 
1087, 1093–94 (8th Cir. 2013); Demahy v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 702 F.3d 177, 184 (5th Cir. 
2012); Smith v. Wyeth, Inc., 657 F.3d 420, 424 (6th Cir. 2011); Foster, 29 F.3d at 167; 
Coleson v. Janssen Pharm., Inc., 251 F. Supp. 3d 716, 721–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); Chatman v. 
Pfizer, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 2d 641, 658 (S.D. Miss. 2013); Couick, 691 F. Supp. 2d at 645; 
Stoddard, 630 F. Supp. 2d at 631; Sharp v. Leichus, No. 2004-CA-0643, 2006 WL 515532, at 
*7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 17, 2006); PLIVA, Inc. v. Dement, 780 S.E.2d 735, 743 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2015); Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353, 380 (Iowa 2014); Stanley v. Wyeth, Inc., 991 
So. 2d 31, 35 (La. Ct. App. 2008); Flynn v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 627 N.W.2d 342, 350 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2001); Franzman v. Wyeth, Inc., 451 S.W.3d 676, 691 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014); 
Silva v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., No. 31,276, 2013 WL 4516160, at *4 (N.M. Ct. App. 
Feb. 7, 2013); Weese v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 153742/12, 2013 WL 5691993, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Oct. 8, 2013); McNair v. Johnson & Johnson, 818 S.E.2d 852, 867 (W. Va. 2018). 
 54. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 380. 
 55. See McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 867. 
 56. Issues of tort law are generally a matter of state substantive law.  Thus, federal court 
decisions on the duty question are predictions of what the state’s highest court would hold as 
a matter of law.  Accordingly, while federal decisions are relevant to the duty question, they 
are not dispositive on substantive state law questions. See Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 159 So. 3d 
649, 663 (Ala. 2014) (recognizing a duty of care in response to a question certified from the 
Middle District of Alabama).  As the Eleventh Circuit observed, “considerations of comity 
and federalism counsel that we proceed gingerly when venturing into uncharted waters of state 
substantive law.” See Guarino, 719 F.3d at 1251. 
 57. See, e.g., Garner v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 1:16-cv-01494-SLD-JEH, 2017 WL 
6945335, at *7–8 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2017); Kellogg v. Wyeth, 762 F. Supp. 2d 694, 709 (D. 
Vt. 2010); Weeks, 159 So. 3d at 649; T.H. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 407 P.3d 18, 47–48 (Cal. 
2017); Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299, 318 (Ct. App. 2008); Rafferty v. Merck & 
Co., 92 N.E.3d 1205, 1219–20 (Mass. 2018). 
 58. 407 P.3d 18 (Cal. 2017). 
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owed injured generic users a duty to warn of adverse side effects.59  In 
Novartis, the plaintiffs were newborns who had developed brain defects 
while in utero because their mothers had ingested the generic drug 
terbutaline.60  The newborns subsequently brought suit against Novartis for 
negligently failing to warn of terbutaline’s developmental side effects.61  In 
its defense, Novartis contended that it owed no duty to warn of the 
developmental side effects at issue for the plain fact that their mothers had 
not ingested Novartis’s drug.62 
The Supreme Court of California, however, emphatically disagreed with 
Novartis, and after applying a multifactor duty test, held that a duty of care 
flowed between Novartis and the injured generic plaintiffs.63  Embedded in 
the court’s rationale was a “constellation of [duty] factors,” led by 
foreseeability and public policy.64  On the foreseeability consideration, the 
court reasoned that it was “entirely foreseeable” to Novartis that any defects 
in its warning label would generate risks of harm to generic users because of 
federal law’s requirement that generic manufacturers maintain the same 
warning labels as their brand-name counterparts.65  Thus, because Novartis 
could foresee harm to generic users, the court stated that the company owed 
a duty to adequately warn generic users of adverse side effects.66 
In addition to foreseeability, the Novartis court also found public policy to 
cut in favor of imposing a duty of care.67  For one, the court observed that 
recognizing duty would expose Novartis to increased failure-to-warn liability 
and, accordingly, would further incentivize Novartis to diligently update its 
warning labels once new side effects came to light.68  Indeed, the court found 
this public policy justification particularly compelling since brand-name 
manufacturers, under PLIVA, are the only market participants capable of 
unilaterally strengthening prescription drug warning labels.69  Thus, after 
balancing both principle and policy, the court concluded that a duty of care 
existed and paved the way for the newborn plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims 
to proceed to trial.70 
Just three months after the Novartis decision, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court in Rafferty v. Merck & Co.71 also held that a duty of care 
 
 59. Id. at 47. 
 60. Id. at 22. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id.  A wrinkle in the facts was that, by the time of litigation, Novartis had divested 
ownership of the brand-name drug. See id. at 40.  Novartis claimed that this divestment 
extinguished liability, but the court ultimately rejected this argument. See id. at 47. 
 63. Id. at 28. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 29. 
 66. Id.  The court also found additional considerations—the degree of certainty that the 
plaintiff suffered injury, closeness of the relationship, moral blame, and availability of 
insurance—to weigh in favor of recognizing a duty of care. Id. at 28–30. 
 67. Id. at 31–32. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 47. 
 71. 92 N.E.3d 1205 (Mass. 2018). 
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existed between brand-name manufacturers and generic users.72  Like its 
predecessor court in Novartis,73 the Rafferty court agreed that foreseeability 
cut in favor of recognizing a duty of care;74 however, on the public policy 
issue, the court found itself at a crossroads.75  On the one hand, the court 
reasoned that recognizing a duty of care would provide much-needed relief 
to injured generic users and enhance the financial incentive for brand names 
to vigilantly warn of adverse side effects.76  But on the other hand, the court 
observed that imposing a duty could expose brand-name manufacturers to 
excessive liability and potentially chill prescription drug innovation.77  After 
weighing the competing policy considerations at stake, the court split the 
baby and held that brand-name manufacturers owe generic users a duty “not 
to act in reckless disregard of an unreasonable risk of death or grave bodily 
injury.”78  Thus, by recalibrating the standard of care under the breach 
element from negligence to recklessness, the court endeavored to limit brand-
name manufacturer liability while still holding the manufacturer accountable 
for its more egregious conduct.79  Under Rafferty, then, generic users could 
bring reckless—but not negligent—failure-to-warn claims against brand-
name manufacturers.80 
In sum, this pair of well-reasoned state supreme court decisions, Novartis 
and Rafferty, represents a pivotal development in prescription drug failure-
to-warn jurisprudence.  To be sure, although courts recognizing a duty of care 
are still the exception—not the norm81—this minority view now has bite due 
to the endorsement of the high courts of California and Massachusetts.  At 
the same time, however, it is necessary to temper this optimism with 
pragmatism, given the status quo majority “no duty” view.82  Thus, this Part 
now turns to two emblematic cases of this majority view. 
C.  The Majority Position:  Iowa and West Virginia 
In July 2014, the Supreme Court of Iowa decided Huck v. Wyeth, Inc.,83 a 
now-leading authority in the no duty case law.  In Huck, the plaintiff 
consumed the generic drug—metoclopramide—and consequently developed 
severe tardive dyskinesia, a disease which the manufacturer had failed to 
 
 72. Id. at 1219. 
 73. Interestingly, despite the two cases’ close proximity to one another, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court did not reference the California decision in its opinion. 
 74. Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1213–14. 
 75. See id. at 1215–20. 
 76. Id. at 1217–18. 
 77. Id. at 1215–17.  But see T.H. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 407 P.3d 18, 32 (Cal. 2017) 
(observing that imposing a duty of care would not place an onerous burden on brand-name 
manufacturers because they are already obligated under federal law to warn of ongoing risks). 
 78. Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1219. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1219–20. 
 81. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 82. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 83. 850 N.W.2d 353 (Iowa 2014). 
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adequately warn her about.84  Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff sued the 
manufacturers of metoclopramide and metoclopramide’s brand-name 
equivalent on a failure-to-warn theory.85  But from the outset, the plaintiff’s 
claims against the generic manufacturer were preempted under PLIVA.86  
Thus, the only tenable claims left standing before the Supreme Court of Iowa 
were the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claims alleged against the manufacturer 
of metoclopramide’s brand-name equivalent.87  The viability of these claims, 
in turn, rested on the threshold question of whether the brand-name defendant 
owed a duty to warn of tardive dyskinesia to the generic plaintiff.88 
In addressing this gateway duty question, the court concluded that the 
brand-name defendant owed no duty to warn of injurious side effects to 
generic users, such as the plaintiff.89  Though the court’s opinion contained 
a treasure trove of arguments supporting no duty,90 the driving engine of its 
decision rested on two primary rationales.  First, the plaintiff’s case was 
essentially a product liability action—cloaked in negligence—which lacked 
the necessary causation predicate,91 and, second, compelling public policy 
considerations counseled against finding a duty of care.92 
To begin, the court held that causation was a necessary predicate for 
imposing a duty of care under Iowa tort law.  This proved fatal to the 
plaintiff’s claim since her injury was caused by the generic drug—
metoclopramide—and not the brand-name drug.93  Accordingly, duty could 
not exist because the causation requirement necessary under Iowa law could 
not be met.94  In addition, the court took into consideration the public policy 
implications of imposing a duty of care and found duty undesirable because 
it would levy a substantial burden on brand-name manufacturers to 
compensate a vast population of the prescription drug industry; thus, this 
policy concern provided an additional justification to reject duty.95  Indeed, 
by emphasizing the public policy considerations in conducting its duty 
analysis, the Huck court manifested its conception of the duty element under 
negligence as merely a euphemism for a cost-benefit analysis of liability, 
which in this case, warranted a no duty decision.96 
 
 84. Id. at 358–60. 
 85. Id. at 360–62. 
 86. Id. at 361; see also PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 614–15 (2011). 
 87. Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 361. 
 88. See id. 
 89. Id. at 380. 
 90. See id. at 369–82. 
 91. See id. at 371–75; see also infra Part III.B.1. 
 92. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 376–81. 
 93. See id. at 376. 
 94. See id. 
 95. Id. at 377. 
 96. See id. at 376 (“In short, a lack of duty may be found if either the relationship between 
the parties or [public] policy considerations warrants such a conclusion.” (quoting McCormick 
v. Nikkel & Assocs., 819 N.W.2d 368, 371 (Iowa 2012))). 
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Four years later, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia followed 
suit in McNair v. Johnson & Johnson97 and declined to recognize duty.98  In 
McNair, the plaintiff began suffering from acute respiratory distress 
syndrome (ARDS) after consuming the generic drug levofloxacin.99  
Levofloxacin’s warning label, however, did not include the risk of ARDS 
because its brand-name counterpart, Levaquin, also lacked warning of ARDS 
in its label.100  Hence, the injured plaintiff filed suit against Levaquin’s 
manufacturer on the theory that it had negligently failed to warn about the 
risk of ARDS.101  Here, like Huck, the duty question took center stage as the 
focus of appellate review before West Virginia’s highest court. 
After examining a series of duty considerations, the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of West Virginia concluded that Levaquin’s manufacturer owed no 
duty to warn of ARDS to the plaintiff.102  Similar to the reasoning in Huck, 
the court found the lack of causation by the brand-name product103 and 
underlying public policy concerns to foreclose the possibility of duty.104  
Additionally, while the court acknowledged that foreseeability cut against its 
position,105 it nevertheless hunkered down and buttressed its reasoning with 
a litany of federal and state no duty precedents.106  In sum, West Virginia’s 
highest court, too, viewed the duty element of negligence as predominantly 
a question of public policy and, after weighing the competing policy interests 
at stake, declined to recognize duty in order to cater to compelling policy 
interests.107 
 
III.  KEY ARGUMENTS UNDERGIRDING BOTH SIDES OF THE 
DUTY QUESTION 
Generic users have predominantly litigated failure-to-warn claims against 
brand-name defendants under the traditional tort of negligence or the tort of 
negligent misrepresentation.108  Regardless, the inquiry that is universally 
significant, and the central focus of this Note, is the threshold question of 
whether the brand-name manufacturer owes a duty of care to generic users 
in providing adequate warning labels.109  This inquiry is crucial because a 
finding of no duty by courts in the first instance sounds the death knell for 
 
 97. 818 S.E.2d 852 (W. Va. 2018). 
 98. Id. at 861. 
 99. Id. at 858–59. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 861. 
 103. Id. at 863. 
 104. Id. at 865–67. 
 105. See id. at 862. 
 106. See id. at 863. 
 107. See id. at 865. 
 108. See, e.g., T.H. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 407 P.3d 18, 26 (Cal. 2017) (addressing both 
negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims). 
 109. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 12, at 658–59 (observing that forty-eight states 
retain duty as an element of negligence). 
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generic users’ negligence claims.110  Thus, this Note now turns to the key 
arguments courts have considered in reaching their conclusions about the 
existence of a duty of care.  This Part begins by discussing the principal 
arguments supporting duty and then transitions to the key rationales 
undergirding the no duty position. 
A.  Key Arguments Supporting the Existence of Duty 
Courts, in finding a duty of care, have advanced a string of recurring 
arguments in support of their positions.  Chief among them are prominent 
doctrinal factors, such as reasonable foreseeability, and public policy 
considerations.  This section discusses these in turn. 
1.  Reasonable Foreseeability Supports Duty 
Since the dawn of negligence in common law,111 the foreseeability of 
physical harm has endured as a significant consideration with respect to the 
duty element.112  This is not a coincidence given that the principle underlying 
foreseeability is a powerfully intuitive one:  when conducting an activity that 
raises a foreseeable risk of harm to a class of persons, take due care to prevent 
such harms from being realized.  This timeless principle, as applied to the 
brand-name, generic-user context, produces a compelling justification for 
courts recognizing a duty of care from the former to the latter.113 
Well established under federal law is the obligation of generic 
manufacturers to maintain the same warning labels as those of the brand 
name.114  Accordingly, due to this sui generis federal scheme, the brand-
name manufacturer “knows to a legal certainty” that any deficiencies in its 
own warning label will also contaminate the generic drug’s label.115  
Precisely because the brand name knows this crucial fact—that a defective 
brand-name label will cause an identically defective generic label—courts 
have found that the risk of harm to generic users is foreseeable and that this 
foreseeability, in turn, generates a duty of care between brand names and 
 
 110. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 111. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916) (considering 
foreseeability under duty); Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 409–10 (1852) (same); see also 
Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299, 311–12 (Ct. App. 2008) (stating that foreseeability 
has been a primary consideration under duty for over eighty years). 
 112. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate Cause, 44 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1247, 1258–62 (2009) (finding that every state, except three, treats 
foreseeability as a “significant factor” in analyzing duty of care in negligence cases). 
 113. See, e.g., Kellogg v. Wyeth, 762 F. Supp. 2d 694, 706 (D. Vt. 2010) (finding that the 
risk of harm to generic users was “entirely foreseeable”); Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 159 So. 3d 
649, 670 (Ala. 2014) (holding that foreseeability favors finding a duty of care); Novartis, 407 
P.3d at 29–30; Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 311–12 (finding a duty of care based on 
foreseeability); Rafferty v. Merck & Co., 92 N.E.3d 1205, 1215 (Mass. 2018). 
 114. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 624 (2011). 
 115. Novartis, 407 P.3d at 29; see also Kellogg, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 706; Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d 
at 1215. 
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generic users.116  Furthermore, some courts have gone even further and 
observed that injury to generic users is not simply foreseeable but eminently 
foreseeable and that federal law’s obligation of warning-label equivalence 
elevates the degree of foreseeability to near certitude.117  Therefore, the 
conclusion follows that the amplified degree of harm foreseen by the brand-
name manufacturer obligates it to take reasonable care to avoid causing such 
harm to generic users.118 
As the case law demonstrates, foreseeability has turned out to be a 
powerful justification:  nearly every court ruling in favor of duty has relied 
substantially on foreseeability to supply its rationale.119  Among them, three 
state supreme courts—Alabama,120 California,121 and Massachusetts122—
have found foreseeability to be highly probative of duty.  Conversely, courts 
coming out the other way and holding no duty have also acknowledged that 
foreseeability cuts against their position.123  Nevertheless, these courts justify 
their no duty holdings with other considerations, such as public policy.124 
Though federal law does most of the heavy lifting in furnishing 
foreseeability, state regulatory regimes also play a prominent role.  Currently, 
all fifty states have “state substitution laws” which permit—and sometimes 
even require—pharmacists to substitute brand-name prescriptions with 
generic drugs where it is more affordable for the patient.125  Under such a 
regulatory regime, a generic user may have been originally prescribed a 
 
 116. See Kellogg, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 706; Novartis, 407 P.3d at 29–30; Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d 
at 1215. 
 117. Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 311–13; see Kellogg, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 706; Novartis, 407 
P.3d at 29; Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1215. 
 118. See Kellogg, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 706; Novartis, 407 P.3d at 29; Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 
311–12; Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1215. 
 119. See, e.g., Garner v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 1:16-cv-01494-SLD-JEH, 2017 WL 
6945335, at *7 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2017) (recognizing a duty of care because injuries to generic 
users were reasonably foreseeable); Kellogg, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 705; Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 
159 So. 3d 649, 670 (Ala. 2014) (ruling for duty based on the foreseeability of harm); Novartis, 
407 P.3d at 29–30; Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 311–12; Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1214. 
 120. See Weeks, 159 So. 3d at 670. 
 121. See Novartis, 407 P.3d at 29–30. 
 122. See Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1214. 
 123. See, e.g., Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 727 F.3d 1273, 1284–86 (10th Cir. 2013) (discussing 
foreseeability but finding no duty on other grounds); McNair v. Johnson & Johnson, 818 
S.E.2d 852, 862 (W. Va. 2018) (noting that foreseeability is “important” but finding no duty 
on policy grounds).  But see Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353, 375–76 (Iowa 2014) 
(holding that there existed no duty of care but observing that foreseeability does not enter the 
analysis). 
 124. See infra Part III.B. 
 125. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 628 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(“Currently, all States have some form of generic substitution law.”); Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 
1216; see also Schwartz et al., supra note 48, at 1846–48 (observing that all fifty states have 
adopted some version of state substitution laws allowing pharmacists to fill a brand-name 
prescription with a more affordable generic equivalent).  Note that generic drugs are generally 
cheaper than their brand-name counterparts, which makes statutory substitution highly likely 
in many states. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., UNDERSTANDING RECENT TRENDS IN 
GENERIC DRUG PRICES 1 (2016), https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/175071/ 
GenericsDrugpaperr.pdf [https://perma.cc/434C-B5GE]. 
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brand-name drug but, due to statutory substitution, is forced to consume the 
generic version126 and thus preempted from suing under PLIVA.127 
As applied to duty, courts have found that statutory substitution laws 
enhance the foreseeability argument because they alert the brand-name 
manufacturer to the reality that many generic users will rely directly on its 
warning label despite ultimately consuming a generic counterpart.128  
Accordingly, whether the consumer bought and ingested the brand-name 
drug is no longer an accurate litmus test for who, in fact, initially relied on 
the brand-name drug’s warning label.129  As a result, state substitution laws 
have been construed to add an extra layer of depth to the foreseeability 
argument.130 
Additionally, state substitution laws—as applied to the brand-name, 
generic-user context—arguably pose a fundamental fairness concern.  In her 
scathing dissent in PLIVA, Justice Sotomayor claimed that preempting 
generic users from suing is inequitable because state substitution laws permit 
pharmacists to unilaterally swap brand-name prescriptions with generic 
ones.131  Therefore, in a jurisdiction with a statutory substitution regime, 
preempting generic users from bringing suit would unfairly penalize them for 
the state-mandated dispensing decisions of their pharmacists.132  Were it not 
for state substitution laws, Justice Sotomayor contended, generic users who 
had initially been prescribed brand-name drugs would have retained their 
right to sue if they suffered injurious side effects.133  Thus, to conclude, state 
substitution laws present a basic fairness concern that sheds doubt on the 
brand-name, generic-user dichotomy. 
2.  Recognizing Duty Is Sound Public Policy 
Although opponents of duty have relied heavily on public policy 
considerations to justify their positions,134 courts taking the minority view 
have managed to advance several public policy rationales of their own. 
 
 126. See Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 159 So. 3d 649, 670 (Ala. 2014); Novartis, 407 P.3d at 30; 
Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 299, 313 (Ct. App. 2008). 
 127. See PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 609. 
 128. See Weeks, 159 So. 3d at 670; Novartis, 407 P.3d at 30; Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 313. 
 129. See Weeks, 159 So. 3d at 670. 
 130. See id.; Novartis, 407 P.3d at 30; Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 313. 
 131. See PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 643 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[W]hether a consumer 
harmed by inadequate warnings can obtain relief turns solely on the happenstance of whether 
her pharmacist filled her prescription with a brand-name or generic drug.”).  Also note that 
this problem is further perpetuated by the reality that most prescription drug consumers do not 
know ex ante that consuming the brand-name drug preserves their right to legal redress, while 
consuming the generic drug shuts them out under PLIVA.  Thus, maintaining the distinction 
between generic-drug and brand-name-drug users effects an inequitable result not attributable 
to a conscious purchase decision by the consumer. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See id.; see also Weeks, 159 So. 3d at 670; Novartis, 407 P.3d at 30. 
 134. See infra Part III.B. 
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a.  The Incentive to Keep Warning 
One public policy served by imposing a duty of care is the incentive it 
would provide for brand-name manufacturers to continuously update their 
warning labels beyond their exclusivity periods.135  It is a widely known fact 
that brand-name manufacturers experience a “precipitous decline” in sales 
once their exclusivity periods end and generic drugs enter the market.136  
Unsurprisingly, due to competition from their cheaper generic-drug 
counterparts, brand-name pharmaceuticals occupy less than 10 percent of the 
market after the exclusivity period.137  In turn, commensurate with the brand-
name drug’s decline in drug sales is its manufacturer’s waning incentive to 
vigilantly warn of ongoing and future side effects.138  Indeed, this incentive 
deficit is a natural offshoot of the brand name’s substantially reduced market 
share, which translates to an equally reduced threat of consumer litigation.139  
Thus, once the brand-name drug’s exclusivity protection ends, its 
manufacturer is under little financial incentive to carefully research and warn 
of new risks that flow from its drug.140 
Some courts have found that one way to cure this incentive problem is to 
recognize a duty of care between brand-name manufacturers and generic 
users.141  The Rafferty court reasoned that if it were to recognize duty, 
thereby paving the way for generic users to bring failure-to-warn claims 
against brand-name manufacturers, then the brand name would have a 
considerable financial incentive to continuously update its warning label 
even when its monopoly had ceased.142  The court opined that this would 
make for sound public policy because stronger warnings on brand-name 
drugs would have a trickle-down effect on generic-drug labels, and this 
trickle-down effect would enhance the overall safety of prescription drug use 
throughout the industry.143 
The Novartis and Rafferty courts also contended that replenishing the 
financial incentive to warn was of heightened importance because the brand-
name manufacturer is the only authority, under PLIVA, that can unilaterally 
strengthen prescription drug warning labels.144  Thus, without a sufficient 
incentive to warn, the whole industry could suffer from underwarning 
because generic manufacturers are also immune from failure-to-warn 
 
 135. See Novartis, 407 P.3d at 31; Rafferty v. Merck & Co., 92 N.E.3d 1205, 1217 (Mass. 
2018). 
 136. Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1216; see also DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 
125, at 2 (“88 percent of dispensed prescriptions are for generic drugs . . . .”). 
 137. See Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1217; DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 125, 
at 14. 
 138. See Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1217. 
 139. See id. 
 140. See id.  Note, however, that under federal law, brand-name manufacturers are already 
under an obligation to continuously research and warn of potential side effects. See T.H. v. 
Novartis Pharm. Corp, 407 P.3d 18, 32 (Cal. 2017); Schwartz et al., supra note 48, at 1844. 
 141. See Novartis, 407 P.3d at 31; Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1217. 
 142. See Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1217. 
 143. See id. 
 144. See id.; see also Novartis, 407 P.3d at 32. 
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liability.145  Indeed, the Rafferty court made this concern abundantly clear 
when it stated that “no one—neither the generic manufacturer nor the brand-
name manufacturer—would have a complete incentive to maintain safe 
labels.”146  Therefore, it found that recognizing a duty of care would help 
effectuate the prudent public policy of incentivizing adequate prescription 
drug warning throughout the industry.147 
b.  “A Right Without a Remedy” 
The other major public policy served by recognizing a duty of care is the 
avenue of legal recourse it would provide for injured generic users in 
vindicating the harms they suffered.148  As stated before, generic 
manufacturers are currently immunized from failure-to-warn liability, 
meaning injured generic users cannot bring suit against the manufacturers of 
their drugs.149  Therefore, the only viable option left is for generic users to 
bring suit against the brand-name manufacturer.150  Against this backdrop, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court expressed concern that its finding 
of no duty would, in effect, foreclose the last opportunity for generic 
plaintiffs to obtain legal relief for their injuries.151  This concern is certainly 
plausible given that nearly 90 percent of all prescription drug consumers are 
generic-drug users.152  Accordingly, to find no duty of care would in essence 
shut out 90 percent of all prescription drug consumers from any means of 
legal redress should they suffer adverse side effects.153  Therefore, while the 
Rafferty court believed this “a right without a remedy” argument did not, by 
itself, establish a duty of care, it nevertheless found it to be a compelling 
public policy consideration.154 
 
 145. See Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1217–18. 
 146. Id. at 1217.  Some brand-name defendants have argued in response that imposing a 
duty of care will lead to overwarning of side effects, which will “dilute the effectiveness of 
any individual warning.” But see Novartis, 407 P.3d at 33 (rejecting this overwarning 
argument). 
 147. See Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1217–18. 
 148. See id. at 1218. 
 149. See supra Part II.A. 
 150. See Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1218. 
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 152. See PHRMA, BIOPHARMACEUTICALS IN PERSPECTIVE 1, 49 (2017), http://phrma-
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pocket jurisprudence is law without principle.” See Schwartz et al., supra note 48, at 1844.  
Likewise, this Note does not rely on this argument to advance its position. 
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B.  Key Arguments Undergirding the No Duty Position 
The majority position, as reflected in the case law, is the position that 
manufacturers of brand-name drugs do not owe a duty of care to generic 
users.155  Embedded within this position are various arguments—advanced 
by courts, brand-name defendants, and commentators alike—that provide a 
smattering of tort doctrine, public policy, and general legal principles.  
Among them, this Note identifies and discusses the emblematic arguments 
undergirding the no duty position. 
This section begins by examining the argument that negligence suits by 
generic plaintiffs are an end run around strict products liability claims that 
cannot proceed due to lack of causation.  This section then discusses the 
doctrinal arguments for finding no duty and concludes with an analysis of the 
key public policy considerations put forth by duty opponents. 
1.  Negligence Is an End Run Around Strict Products Liability 
Duty opponents have argued that failure-to-warn negligence suits brought 
by generic users against brand-name defendants are merely an end run around 
strict products liability law that should be prohibited.156  Strict products 
liability jurisprudence traces its origins to section 402A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, which advocated a new theory of liability—strict 
liability—borne by manufacturers for injuries caused by their products’ 
defects.157  The Restatement’s rationale for this liability was grounded in 
fairness:  a seller should assume responsibility for harms caused by its own 
product.158  Another rationale was public policy, as sellers were thought to 
be in the best position to compensate their injured users by absorbing such 
costs as the price of doing business.159  Thus, for a plaintiff to assert a strict 
products liability claim, Restatement section 402A required proof of 
causation:  the plaintiff must prove that her alleged injury was caused by the 
defendant’s product.160 
These core principles of fairness and public policy have, in turn, provided 
a substantial justification for shielding brand-name manufacturers from 
 
 155. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 156. See, e.g., Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 169–70 (4th Cir. 1994); 
Couick v. Wyeth, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 2d 643, 645 (W.D.N.C. 2010) (“While the plaintiff’s 
claims are masked in various legal theories, they are premised on a single claim of product 
liability.”); Stoddard v. Wyeth, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 2d 631, 633 (E.D.N.C. 2009) (“Although 
cloaked in different theories for recovery, plaintiffs’ claims are nevertheless product liability 
claims.”); Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353, 373 (Iowa 2014); see also Schwartz et al., 
supra note 48, at 1860–61. 
 157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 158. See id. (justifying strict liability on the rationale that a product’s seller “has undertaken 
and assumed a special responsibility toward” its user); see also Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 378 
(holding that products liability law “place[s] responsibility for the harm caused by a product” 
because the manufacturer profited from it). 
 159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also 
Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 376; McNair v. Johnson & Johnson, 818 S.E.2d 852, 866 (W. Va. 2018). 
 160. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
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liability for failure to warn generic plaintiffs.161  The argument’s starting 
point is that generic users are precluded from bringing strict products liability 
actions against brand-name manufacturers because their injuries flow from a 
generic drug, not the brand-name drug.162  But, in addition, opponents of duty 
further argue that the same rationales precluding generic users from asserting 
strict products liability claims apply equally and with the same effect to 
negligence claims brought against the brand-name defendant.163  This can be 
appropriately referred to as the “end run” argument because it essentially 
views generic users’ failure-to-warn claims as an end run around traditional 
strict products liability. 
The crux of the end run argument is that permitting the generic user to get 
a second bite at the apple through a negligence suit frustrates the narrowly 
confined and carefully crafted parameters of strict products liability.164  
Implicit here is the premise that strict products liability is the exclusive form 
of liability for product defects under tort law; thus, generic users’ negligence 
suits perpetuate an impermissible circumvention around section 402A.165  
Indeed, when viewed in a vacuum, permitting the end run presents an 
inherently uncomfortable proposition by requiring one manufacturer—the 
brand name—to potentially absorb the liability costs of its competitors.166 
In addition, courts have also found that allowing generic users’ failure-to-
warn claims to proceed based on the technical distinction that they sound in 
negligence, rather than strict products liability, would also frustrate strict 
products liability’s core public policy aim of limiting a manufacturer’s 
liability to harm caused by only its own products.167  As the McNair court 
observed, brand-name manufacturers “cannot spread the cost of 
compensating generic consumers” because they do not market or profit from 
the generic drug’s sale.168  Thus, the argument holds that the brand name is 
not best situated to absorb the burdens of liability for injuries caused by 
generic drugs.169 
Numerous state legislatures have taken steps to prevent the end run around 
strict products liability by enacting products liability statutes.170  Products 
liability statutes collapse all claims alleging harm from a defective product, 
regardless of the theory of liability, under the unitary heading of “product 
 
 161. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 376; McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 866. 
 162. See McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 866 (rejecting generic plaintiff’s strict products liability 
claim for lack of causation). 
 163. See, e.g., Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 376; McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 866. 
 164. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 376; McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 866. 
 165. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 376; McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 866. 
 166. Commentators have, in fact, viewed this proposition to be in tension with the basic 
spirit of products liability law, which is to place liability flowing from a product’s defects on 
the manufacturer of that particular product. Schwartz et al., supra note 48, at 1844. 
 167. See Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 170 (4th Cir. 1994) (“We also 
reject the contention that a name brand manufacturer’s statements regarding its drug can serve 
as the basis for liability for injuries caused by another manufacturer’s drug.”). 
 168. McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 866. 
 169. See id. 
 170. Twenty-five states have products liability statutes. See Schwartz et al., supra note 48, 
at 1861. 
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liability action.”171  In turn, courts have interpreted these statutes to require 
proof of causation for any claim arising out of a defective product.172  This 
practice has indeed proven fatal to generic plaintiffs’ negligence suits 
because generic users, by definition, cannot prove that the brand-name 
manufacturer caused their injuries.173  As a result, many courts applying 
products liability statutes to generic users’ failure-to-warn claims do not even 
go so far as to entertain the duty question because they can dispose the case 
on statutory grounds.174  Thus, these statutes provide courts with a powerful 
tool—causation—to sidestep the duty question and thereby render the 
generic user’s claim a nonstarter. 
To summarize, proponents of the end run argument view generic users’ 
failure-to-warn claims to be in conflict with core principles underlying strict 
products liability, and they further contend that such claims amount to 
nothing more than a circumvention of strict products liability law that ought 
not be sanctioned.  At the same time, state products liability statutes give 
courts the means to stop this end run effect and rid their dockets of generic 
users’ failure-to-warn claims.  While this may certainly incur collateral 
costs—for example, shutting injured generic users out from legal redress—
such costs nevertheless take a backseat to the more egregious end run effect 
which takes precedence.175 
2.  Doctrinal Arguments Weighing Against Duty 
Courts and brand-name defendants have argued in the alternative that, 
even if generic users’ failure-to-warn claims are truly distinct and are not 
merely an end run around strict products liability, these claims still cannot 
 
 171. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.300(1) (West 2018) (“[A] ‘product liability 
action’ shall include any action brought for or on account of personal injury . . . caused by or 
resulting from the manufacture . . . of any product.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-8 (West 
2019) (“‘Product liability action’ means any claim or action brought by a claimant for harm 
caused by a product, irrespective of the theory underlying the claim . . . .”). 
 172. See, e.g., Lashley v. Pfizer, Inc., 750 F.3d 470, 476–77 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that, 
under Mississippi and Texas statutes, the plaintiff must establish that his injuries were caused 
by the defendant’s product to proceed with failure-to-warn claims); Franzman v. Wyeth, Inc., 
451 S.W.3d 676, 690 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (“To succeed on a product liability claim under 
[the Kentucky product liability statute] . . . a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s product 
is the legal cause of her injuries.”).  Some states have folded negligence into strict products 
liability by requiring proof of causation even without a state statute. See, e.g., Guarino v. 
Wyeth, LLC, 719 F.3d 1245, 1251 (11th Cir. 2013) (requiring the plaintiffs to prove causation 
under Florida common law); Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353, 371 (Iowa 2014) (finding 
that, under Iowa common law, a plaintiff must establish causation to proceed with failure-to-
warn claims against a defendant). 
 173. See, e.g., Demahy v. Schwarz Pharm. Inc., 702 F.3d 177, 182 (5th Cir. 2012) (applying 
the Louisiana product liability statute and dismissing generic users’ failure-to-warn claims); 
Smith v. Wyeth, Inc., 657 F.3d 420, 423–24 (6th Cir. 2011) (applying the Kentucky statute to 
dismiss claims). 
 174. See, e.g., Lashley, 750 F.3d at 476–77 (applying a products liability statute and not 
addressing the negligence duty question). 
 175. See Guarino, 719 F.3d at 1253 (prioritizing the causation argument over providing a 
remedy to generic users); McNair v. Johnson & Johnson, 818 S.E.2d 852, 866 (W. Va. 2018) 
(same). 
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proceed to trial because brand-name manufacturers do not owe a duty of care 
to generic users.176  At its base, the claim is that brand-name manufacturers 
owe a duty to warn of adverse side effects only to the users of its products 
and no one else.177  Although courts have fashioned their no duty findings 
predominantly on a public policy rationale—which is examined in the next 
section—they have also advanced a number of doctrinal arguments. 
First, courts have reasoned that recognizing a duty of care between brand-
name manufacturers and generic users would “stretch the concept of 
foreseeability too far.”178  In Foster v. American Home Products Corp.,179 
the Fourth Circuit authored this famous line and declined to recognize a duty 
of care; however, the court failed to adequately explain what it is about 
recognizing a duty of care that stretches the doctrinal principle of 
foreseeability too far.180  And although subsequent courts have latched onto 
this argument when concluding no duty, they have not adequately analyzed 
its meaning or effect.181 
A proper reading of the Fourth Circuit’s argument is in order.  In 
articulating its “foreseeability stretched too far” proposition, the Fourth 
Circuit was not arguing it was unforeseeable that generic users would rely on 
brand-name drug warning labels.182  Quite the contrary, the court 
acknowledged that foreseeability cut for the generic user, but it nevertheless 
downplayed the significance of foreseeability in its analysis.183  As evidence 
of this, the Fourth Circuit’s opinion pivoted from discussing foreseeability to 
examining privity and reasoned that the absence of privity between generic 
users and brand-name manufacturers justified its conclusion.184  Thus, while 
foreseeability is relevant to the duty analysis, to find it dispositive would 
“stretch” the concept of foreseeability too far,185 and therefore, courts should 
 
 176. See, e.g., Strayhorn v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 737 F.3d 378, 405 (6th Cir. 2013); Foster 
v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 171 (4th Cir. 1994); Simpson v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 
7:10-cv-01771-HGD, 2010 WL 5485812, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 9, 2010); PLIVA, Inc. v. 
Dement, 780 S.E.2d 735, 743 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015) (holding under Georgia tort law that a 
manufacturer’s duty of care only extends to users of its products); Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 
N.W.2d 353, 371 (Iowa 2014); McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 866. 
 177. See, e.g., Strayhorn, 737 F.3d at 405 (holding that, under Tennessee law, a product 
manufacturer owes a duty of care to only its own users, not another product’s users); Foster, 
29 F.3d at 171; Dement, 780 S.E.2d at 743 (holding that, under Georgia tort law, a 
manufacturer’s duty only extends to users of its product); Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 371; McNair, 
818 S.E.2d at 866. 
 178. Foster, 29 F.3d at 171; see also In re Darvocet, Darvon, & Propoxyphene Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 756 F.3d 917, 944 (6th Cir. 2014); Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 727 F.3d 1273, 1285 (10th 
Cir. 2013); Chatman v. Pfizer, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 2d 641, 656 (S.D. Miss. 2013); Huck, 850 
N.W.2d at 370; Stanley v. Wyeth, Inc., 991 So. 2d 31, 34 (La. Ct. App. 2008); McNair, 818 
S.E.2d at 862. 
 179. 29 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 180. See id. at 171. 
 181. See, e.g., In re Darvocet, 756 F.3d at 944; Schrock, 727 F.3d at 1285; Chatman, 960 
F. Supp. 2d at 656; Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 370; Stanley, 991 So. 2d at 34; McNair, 818 S.E.2d 
at 862. 
 182. See Foster, 29 F.3d at 171. 
 183. See id. 
 184. See id. (declining to recognize a duty of care because of the lack of privity). 
 185. See id. 
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judiciously factor in countervailing considerations when deciding the duty 
element.186  The Fourth Circuit’s rebuttal of foreseeability is often construed 
by citing courts as an open invitation to afford generous weight to policy 
rationales that favor a finding of no duty.187 
Second, courts have held that manufacturers of brand-name drugs do not 
owe a duty of care to generic users because they only “intend to 
communicate” with their own consumers.188  In practice, this contention has 
primarily been used to rebuff generic plaintiffs who pursue claims on the tort 
of negligent misrepresentation.189 
One rationale underlying the recognition of the tort of negligent 
misrepresentation is based on equity or fairness:  a party “who negligently 
gives false information to another is subject to liability for physical harm 
caused by action taken by the other in reasonable reliance on such 
information.”190  Thus, the tort generally requires a showing of reasonable 
reliance by the injured party in order to give rise to a cause of action.191  
Consequently, courts have found reasonable reliance to be the Achilles’ heel 
of generic users’ negligent misrepresentation claims because brand-name 
manufacturers only endeavor to warn their own users of adverse side effects, 
not the entire market.192  Privity thus establishes the parameters of reasonable 
reliance on brand-name warning labels, and since generic users lie outside 
the scope of privity, their efforts to prove reasonable reliance are 
unavailing.193 
 
 186. See T.H. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 407 P.3d 18, 28 (Cal. 2017) (“To determine . . . 
duty . . . we balance [a] constellation of factors . . . .”); Sharp v. Leichus, No. 2004-CA-0643, 
2006 WL 515532, at *7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 17, 2006) (“[A]lthough foreseeability is clearly 
relevant to the existence of a duty . . . ‘duty is not established by . . . foreseeability alone.’” 
(quoting Hernandez v. Tallahassee Med. Ctr., Inc., 896 So. 2d 839, 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2005))).  A proper understanding of the Fourth Circuit’s argument is necessary to avoid 
misconstruing which way foreseeability cuts in the duty analysis.  Indeed, one can erroneously 
construe the Fourth Circuit’s argument to mean that the risk of harm to generic users is 
unforeseeable.  This Note, however, views such an interpretation to be mistaken and, more 
plainly, an indefensible position. See infra Part IV.A. 
 187. See, e.g., Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 727 F.3d 1273, 1285 (10th Cir. 2013); Huck v. 
Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353, 370 (Iowa 2014); McNair v. Johnson & Johnson, 818 S.E.2d 
852, 862 (W. Va. 2018) (recognizing foreseeability as one consideration but declining to find 
that the brand-name defendant owed a duty of care in light of “broader policy considerations”). 
 188. See Schrock, 727 F.3d at 1285; Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 613 n.9 (8th 
Cir. 2009); Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 371; Stanley v. Wyeth, Inc., 991 So. 2d 31, 34–35 (La. Ct. 
App. 2008). 
 189. See, e.g., Schrock, 727 F.3d at 1283; Mensing, 588 F.3d at 613 (holding that negligent 
misrepresentation requires “direct communication”); Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 371; Stanley, 991 
So. 2d at 33. 
 190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also id. § 311 
cmt. b; cf. Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 371 (limiting the tort of negligent misrepresentation to sellers 
in the business of disseminating information). 
 191. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 391; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1965). 
 192. See, e.g., Schrock, 727 F.3d at 1282–83; Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 
165, 171 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding that generic users had no basis to justify reliance); Huck, 850 
N.W.2d at 391; Stanley, 991 So. 2d at 33–34. 
 193. See Schrock, 727 F.3d at 1285; Mensing, 588 F.3d at 613 n.9; Foster, 29 F.3d at 170; 
Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 377; Stanley, 991 So. 2d at 34. 
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The other rationale—fairness—also does not translate well given that 
brand-name manufacturers do not further any self-interest by having generic 
users rely on their warning labels.194  Therefore, the argument runs, it is 
inappropriate to impose a duty of care where the brand-name manufacturer 
neither intends to communicate with the generic user nor benefits from the 
generic user’s reliance on its drug’s warning label.195 
Third, courts have argued that recognizing a duty is unfair to brand-name 
manufacturers because they retain “no control” over the generic 
manufacturer’s product.196  The central premise underlying this argument is 
that a party’s liability is limited to that which it has control over.197  Likewise, 
brand-name manufacturers do not market, manufacture, or provide warning 
labels for generic drugs, meaning they have no control over the generic 
drug’s quality or pharmaceutical safety.198  Therefore, courts have declined 
to find a duty of care where the brand-name manufacturer clearly lacked 
control over the generic drug.199 
Finally, some commentators and courts have confronted the foreseeability 
argument head-on by arguing that the generic user’s injury is not a 
foreseeable consequence of the brand’s conduct but merely a foreseeable 
outcome of federal law.200  That is, the risk of harm to generic users generated 
by inadequate warning labels is purely a product of federal law and not the 
brand’s own doing.201  Thus, a rule that obliges brand-name defendants to 
pick up the liability tabs of competitors because of a federal regulatory 
scheme completely out of their control contravenes basic notions of justice 
and puts the generic user’s injury outside the scope of foreseeability. 
 
 194. See Mosley v. Wyeth, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1346 (S.D. Ala. 2010) (finding 
negligent misrepresentation claims to be limited to sellers of information such as real estate 
appraisers and accountants); Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 372 (noting that negligent 
misrepresentation claims are limited to sellers of information in the business of supplying 
information). 
 195. See Schrock, 727 F.3d at 1285; Foster, 29 F.3d at 170; Mosley, 719 F. Supp. 2d at 
1346; Huck 850 N.W.2d at 372. 
 196. Foster, 29 F.3d at 170; see Schrock, 727 F.3d at 1285; Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 378. 
 197. See Schrock, 727 F.3d at 1285; Foster, 29 F.3d at 170; Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 378. 
 198. See Schrock, 727 F.3d at 1285; Foster, 29 F.3d at 170; Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 378 
(stating that the brand-name manufacturer played no part in placing the generic drug in the 
stream of commerce or controlling its pharmaceutical safety). 
 199. See Schrock, 727 F.3d at 1285; Foster, 29 F.3d at 170; Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 378.  One 
interesting argument generic plaintiffs have made, albeit unsuccessfully, is that the brand-
name manufacturer voluntarily undertook a duty of care to generic users by promulgating its 
warning label. See, e.g., Swicegood v. PLIVA, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1356 (N.D. Ga. 
2008) (rejecting the plaintiff’s “Good Samaritan” duty argument). 
 200. See In re Darvocet, Darvon, & Propoxyphene Prods. Liab. Litig., 756 F.3d 917, 944 
(6th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he generic consumers’ injuries are not the foreseeable result of the brand 
manufacturers’ conduct, but of the laws over which the brand manufacturers have no 
control.”); McNair v. Johnson & Johnson, 818 S.E.2d 852, 862 (W. Va. 2018); see also 
Schwartz et al., supra note 48, at 1865 (arguing that federal law creates the foreseeable harm, 
not the brand-name manufacturer’s conduct). 
 201. See In re Darvocet, 756 F.3d at 944; McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 862; see also Schwartz et 
al., supra note 48, at 1865. 
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3.  Public Policy Concerns Weighing Against Duty 
In finding no duty of care, various state and federal courts have relied 
substantially on public policy considerations.202  Furthermore, the high 
courts of Iowa and West Virginia have given these policy considerations 
great weight.203  Indeed, this cost-benefit approach to duty rests on the belief 
that the duty element’s metaphysical purpose is to draw definite lines on tort 
liability,204 and thus, because the benefits of recognizing a duty of care 
between brand-name manufacturers and generic users are outweighed by the 
costs, no duty ought to be recognized.  Having already examined the policy 
virtues of a duty of care,205 this Part now turns to the major public policy 
considerations undergirding the opposite position. 
a.  Recognizing Duty Will Open the Floodgates 
Courts have held that imposing liability on brand-name manufacturers for 
generic users’ injuries would turn them into de facto general insurers of the 
generic-drug market.206  This fear of opening the floodgates of liability has, 
in turn, nudged courts to reject a duty of care.207  To their credit, the 
floodgates concern is not merely hypothetical but, indeed, plausible:  
according to one study, nearly 70 percent of Americans will at some point in 
their lives consume prescription drugs, and, of this massive figure, roughly 
2460 people will die each week of harmful side effects.208  Given the sheer 
size of the prescription drug market and the number of potential plaintiffs—
 
 202. See, e.g., Schrock, 727 F.3d at 1285; Sharp v. Leichus, No. 2004-CA-0643, 2006 WL 
515532, at *7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 17, 2006); Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 378; McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 
862.  Courts ruling in favor of duty have also assessed the public policy considerations cutting 
against this finding. See, e.g., Kellogg v. Wyeth, 762 F. Supp. 2d 694, 706 (D. Vt. 2010) 
(recognizing a duty of care, under Vermont law, on foreseeability grounds despite public 
policy arguments to the contrary); Rafferty v. Merck & Co., 92 N.E.3d 1205, 1220 (Mass. 
2018). 
 203. See, e.g., Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 380; McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 865 (holding that tort law 
is “a question of public policy” that the court should clearly delineate limits on liability).  But 
see Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1220 (holding that generic plaintiffs do not have a negligence cause 
of action but can claim recklessness after balancing policy considerations). 
 204. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 31, at 180 (1941) 
(“‘[D]uty’ is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those 
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to 
protection.”).  For a critique of this view, see generally John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733 (1998). 
 205. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 206. See, e.g., Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 380; McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 863.  But see T.H. v. 
Novartis Pharm. Corp., 407 P.3d 18, 32 (Cal. 2017) (arguing that recognizing a duty of care 
does not impose any additional burden on brand-name manufacturers). 
 207. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 380; McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 863.  In addition to the 
floodgates issue, some argue that to recognize a duty and expose the brand-name manufacturer 
to generic liability perpetuates unfairness because the generic manufacturer takes advantage 
of the brand name’s marketing, research, and development while also shifting liability to the 
brand name. See Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 169–70 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 208. See Michael O. Schroeder, Death by Prescription, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 
27, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://health.usnews.com/health-news/patient-advice/articles/2016-09-
27/the-danger-in-taking-prescribed-medications [https://perma.cc/C6C8-4WM2]. 
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roughly 2460 new candidates each week209—duty opponents argue that the 
brand-name manufacturer would be exposed to far too much liability and far 
too high litigation costs were courts to impose on them a duty of care to 
generic users.210  Thus, to prevent this form of liability without limits, many 
courts have held no duty of care as a matter of law and effectively put the 
brakes on generic users’ claims before they even get to trial.211 
Nestled in the public policy discussion is also an institutional competency 
argument that lends support to the no duty position.212  In declining to 
recognize a duty of care, some courts have espoused the view that the 
judiciary is ill-equipped to adequately assess the broader public policy 
ramifications of recognizing a duty of care.213  In a nutshell, this argument 
asserts that because the potential liability attached to recognizing duty is 
great, the judiciary ought to refrain from finding duty and pass the buck to 
the political branches, which possess institutional advantages in tailoring 
liability in order to avert a potential floodgates problem.214  This belief was 
succinctly expressed by the Supreme Court of Iowa when it observed that 
“courts are not institutionally qualified to balance the complex, interrelated, 
and divergent policy considerations in determining . . . liability obligations 
of brand and generic pharmaceuticals.”215 
Another floodgates concern is the “spillover effect” it could have on other 
factual situations.  In Huck, the Supreme Court of Iowa contended that, if it 
were to impose a duty of care between brand-name manufacturers and 
generic users, then it would similarly have to find duty in every other case 
where one company “mimics” the designs of another company.216  In 
articulating this spillover concern, the court referred to a vital premise 
underlying the no duty position:  a manufacturer is only liable for the injuries 
caused by its own product, not the products of its competitors.217 
 
 209. See id. 
 210. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 380; McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 863. 
 211. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 380; McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 863.  In addition to the pragmatic 
justification of preventing boundless litigation, some have gone further and argued that this 
kind of excessive liability conflicts with a basic value underlying tort law:  to protect free 
enterprise and to create a climate of economic prosperity. See Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 159 
So. 3d 649, 684 (Ala. 2014) (Murdock, J., dissenting) (“An enterprising spirit alone, however, 
is not enough.  The law must protect the fruits of enterprise and create a climate in which trade 
and business innovation can flourish.”). 
 212. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 377; McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 866–67 (stating that courts 
should not interfere with congressional policy choices). 
 213. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 377; McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 866–67. 
 214. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 377; McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 866–67. 
 215. Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 377.  The institutional competency argument has also served an 
additional function in addressing the injustice of leaving injured generic users without legal 
redress. See Guarino v. Wyeth, LLC, 719 F.3d 1245, 1253 (11th Cir. 2013); McNair, 818 
S.E.2d at 866.  Although ruling that there is no duty of care leaves the injured generic user 
without any remedy, courts contend that the ultimate solution should be determined by 
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b.  Imposing Duty Could Chill Innovation 
The other significant public policy consideration undergirding the no duty 
position is the prospect of chilling prescription drug innovation.218  In the last 
quarter century, breakthroughs in prescription pharmaceuticals have 
advanced effective treatments for diseases such as “HIV/AIDS, cancer, and 
heart disease,” among many others.219  Indeed, this impressive track record 
affirms the social desirability of drug innovation and corroborates the need 
for further breakthroughs in the prescription drug industry. 
Given the valuable purposes prescription drugs serve, there are those who 
have argued that future medicinal innovations will be stymied if brand-name 
manufacturers are asked to shoulder the tort liability of their generic 
competitors.220  This argument is particularly persuasive in light of the 
complex and expensive federal regulatory process that already stymies 
successful prescription drug innovation.221  Indeed, after accounting for 
research and development and navigation of the FDA approval process222 the 
cost of innovation rises to the billions.223  In addition, the substantial risk of 
denial by the FDA makes prescription drug innovation an inherently 
precarious venture.224 
Understandably then, courts have been reluctant to impose additional costs 
on brand-name manufacturers out of concern that this imposition may chill 
prescription drug innovation.225  This judicial posture has, in turn, laid the 
groundwork for rejecting a duty of care between brand-name manufacturers 
and generic users, as courts have reasoned that the additional burden of 
compensating generic users—when added to the already high transaction 
costs of drug innovation—may be enough for brand name C-suites across the 
country to halt drug innovation altogether.226  Thus, imposing duty promotes 
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unsound public policy because of the potential chilling effect it could have 
on future pharmaceutical innovations.227 
In conclusion, as this Part illustrates, there are meritorious arguments 
supporting each side of the duty issue.  Understandable, then, is the current 
reality that courts remain deeply divided on this question.228  With this in 
mind, this Note now turns to its own remedial approach for courts to apply 
in addressing whether there exists a duty of care from brand-name 
manufacturers to generic users. 
IV.  RESOLUTION 
This Note contends that a duty of care exists between brand-name 
manufacturers and injured generic users and that this duty, in essence, 
generates an obligation on the brand name to take reasonable care in 
adequately warning generic users of adverse side effects.  In taking this 
stance, this Note conceptualizes the duty element of negligence law as a 
normative obligation that flows from one class of persons to another by virtue 
of the context in which those persons find themselves situated.229  
Appropriately then, the job of the court is to probe the factual circumstances 
in which a given relationship exists in the category of cases at issue and—
based on that initial inquiry—to articulate a decision on whether tort law 
ought to recognize a duty of care.230 
Yet, in the same breath, this Note also acknowledges the countervailing 
Prosserian view of duty adopted by many courts:  that, at its core, duty is a 
question of public policy.231  Using this framework, some commentators232 
and courts have concluded that prudent policy in the context of brand-name 
manufacturers and generic users warrants a no duty conclusion. 
Large philosophical issues of how to think about the duty element in 
negligence law, however, need not be addressed here233 because whichever 
framework is selected, there is a way for courts to recognize a duty of care 
between brand-name manufacturers and generic users.  That is, courts can 
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impose a duty of care on brand-name manufacturers and still retain fidelity 
to both public policy concerns and doctrinal considerations.  This remedial 
position—which Part IV.B discusses at length—rests on two fundamental 
planks. 
First and foremost, the history of tort law and circumstances unique to the 
brand-name, generic-user relationship provide compelling arguments for 
recognizing a duty of care.  This is the doctrinal plank.  Second, in 
recognizing duty, courts are institutionally equipped to address the public 
policy concerns embedded in the duty question because of their core 
competence in crafting tort law.  This is the public policy plank. 
Prior to that discussion, however, this Note does not turn a blind eye to the 
existing no duty arguments found in the case law.  As a token of respect for 
those arguments’ validity, this Part begins by rebutting the key arguments 
advanced by courts in support of no duty. 
A.  Rebutting the No Duty Arguments 
This section rebuts the end run argument and doctrinal considerations 
undergirding the no duty position in the case law.  The public policy 
discussion is reserved for Part IV.B. 
1.  The Negligence Cause of Action Has No End Run Effect 
Duty opponents’ argument that generic users’ negligence suits are a mere 
end run around strict products liability is unpersuasive for several reasons.234  
First, this contention rests on the implicit assumption that strict products 
liability limits manufacturer liability because it forecloses the negligence 
cause of action.  That assumption, however, profoundly misconstrues the role 
of strict products liability in tort law.  Strict products liability, as it originated 
and developed in the common law, did not set out to supplant traditional 
theories of tort liability against manufacturers but rather to create an 
additional pocket of liability based on the closeness of the buyer-seller 
relationship.235  This original intent is thus interpreted to mean that section 
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is a sword to inflict more liability 
on corporate America, not a shield to protect it from conventional theories of 
tort liability.236  Indeed, by wielding strict products liability as a shield 
against negligence, it is the brand-name defendant, and not the generic user, 
who promotes an inequitable end run effect:  the brand wrongly uses strict 
products liability as an end run around traditional negligence law to limit its 
own liability. 
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Second, the end run argument fails in another respect because there is, in 
fact, a plausible distinction between strict liability and negligence in the 
failure-to-warn context.237  As a threshold matter, it is undisputed that 
consumers of brand-name drugs are owed a greater duty of care than what is 
owed to generic users.  This is the case because brand-name users directly 
transact, rely upon, and ultimately ingest the brand-name manufacturer’s 
product.  Accordingly, these circumstances create an inextricable nexus—the 
seller-buyer relationship—that generates the highest duty of vigilance to 
provide adequate warning labels.  And indeed, in acknowledging this special 
relationship, tort law permits brand-name users to succeed on failure-to-warn 
claims on a strict liability theory, thereby allowing plaintiffs to prevail at trial 
without having to prove fault or negligence.238  But there is a catch:  to unlock 
this special privilege, tort law requires that the brand-name user establish that 
her injuries were caused by the brand-name drug.239 
Generic users, in contrast, do not have the power to claim liability without 
fault because they cannot prove causation, meaning they are confined to 
bringing failure-to-warn claims, sounding in negligence, against the brand-
name defendant.240  Such claims are distinct from their strict products 
liability siblings because they require a showing of actual fault under the 
breach element to prevail at trial.  To meet this fault element, the plaintiff 
must demonstrate that the brand-name manufacturer negligently 
promulgated its warning label and that this act of negligence constituted a 
breach of the duty of care owed to the generic user.241  Against this backdrop, 
it makes little sense to require the generic user to prove causation by the 
brand-name product because her suit claims negligence—not strict products 
liability—as the basis for liability. 
Paradoxically, a telling symptom of the end run argument’s flaws is the 
leading no duty case, McNair.  As discussed in Part II.C, the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of West Virginia held in McNair that the generic plaintiffs were 
barred from bringing strict products liability claims against the brand-name 
defendant due to a lack of causation.242  The court, however, then proceeded 
to part two of its analysis, where it separately addressed the plaintiffs’ 
negligence claims and concluded that there was no duty based on public 
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policy considerations.243  Although the court’s duty determination was 
erroneous,244 its analytical approach of distinguishing strict products liability 
from negligence was correct:  strict products liability and negligence are two 
fundamentally distinct theories of liability that do not turn on either’s 
viability.245  Thus, because the two theories run parallel to one another, 
allowing one theory to proceed in lieu of the other does not produce an end 
run effect.246 
2.  No Duty Findings Misconstrue Basic Tort Doctrine 
The doctrinal considerations advanced by courts in finding no duty of care 
also rest on shaky legs, starting with the contention that brand-name 
manufacturers do not “intend to communicate” with generic users and thus 
cannot be held to owe them a duty of care.247  This argument’s fatal flaw 
flows from its unsubstantiated position that the brand-name manufacturer is 
only in privity with its own consumers, and thus, its duty to warn tracks the 
limits of contract.248  Indeed, this reasoning is flawed because it conflates the 
very nature of obligations that arise under tort law with those that originate 
in contract.  Over a century ago, in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,249 then-
Judge Benjamin Cardozo abolished privity as a limit on duty in tort law: 
We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when 
the consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and 
nothing else.  We have put the source of the obligation where it ought to 
be.  We have put its source in the law.250 
Thus, those owed a duty of care by brand-name manufacturers are not limited 
to persons with whom the manufacturers have contracted, but to whom tort 
law says they owe such obligations to.  While contract may, without doubt, 
be one source of legal obligation, it does not subsume the duties imposed on 
brand-name manufacturers by the institution that is tort law.  Therefore, 
privity as a basis for the intended-communication argument presents an 
unworkable model. 
Next, the doctrinal argument claiming that brand-name manufacturers 
possess “no control” over generic drugs and that liability should therefore not 
follow251 also falls short of establishing no duty.  While it is true that brand-
name manufacturers do not retain control over the generic drug’s 
manufacture or marketing, it is equally true that they do control the contents 
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of the generic drug’s warning label.252  This sort of control is relevant and 
sufficient for duty to attach because generic plaintiffs do not claim negligent 
manufacture253 as the basis for their cause of action but rather that the brand-
name defendant was careless in promulgating its warning label and that this 
carelessness furnished a but-for cause of their injury.  Because the claim 
arises out of the brand-name manufacturer’s handling of its own warning 
label and not the generic drug’s manufacture or marketing, liability does, in 
fact, follow control. 
Finally, the argument that injury to generic users is merely a foreseeable 
outcome of federal law—not the brand-name manufacturer’s conduct254—is 
of no moment.  It is one thing to minimize the effect of foreseeability in the 
duty analysis,255 but another to suggest that there are no foreseeable risks of 
harm to generic users stemming from negligent labeling of brand-name 
drugs.  While the former is a defensible position, the latter is not. 
As the case law indicates, federal law’s mandate that generic drugs have 
the same warning labels as their brand-name counterparts supplies 
foreseeability.256  This federal mandate makes it plainly foreseeable to the 
brand-name manufacturer that deficiencies in its warning label “will be 
perpetuated in the label for its generic bioequivalent.”257  Thus, while one 
can certainly criticize such a federal regulatory regime as promoting unsound 
public policy or engendering unfairness, one cannot credibly contend that 
harm to generic users is unforeseeable. 
B.  The Case for Duty 
This Note argues, in essence, that traditional tort doctrine and public policy 
considerations can coalesce in finding a duty of care.  Indeed, in reflecting 
upon the history of the common law and the distinctive features of the brand-
name, generic-user relationship, courts can cobble together a compelling 
doctrinal narrative for finding a duty of care.  But in doing so, courts do not 
work injustice to the other substantial consideration—public policy—that 
underlies the duty inquiry.  This much is true, for courts have the institutional 
expertise—indeed, it’s perhaps their core competence—to craft negligence 
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law in small-bore ways that allow for a duty of care while limiting liability.258  
Furthermore, even if courts fail to rise to the occasion and the floodgates do, 
in fact, burst from recognizing a duty of care, state legislatures and Congress 
have shown the political will and aptitude to regulate the prescription drug 
industry; thus, the political branches stand as a backstop to suspected judicial 
shortcomings.  Against this backdrop, this Note endeavors to convey a 
fighting message to future courts deciding this difficult question:  where tort 
doctrine tells us there is a duty, yet public policy considerations stand in the 
way, we must at least try to remain faithful to principle by giving effect to 
that duty. 
1.  Back to the Basics:  Cardozo’s MacPherson 
History lends formidable support to finding a duty to warn between brand-
name manufacturers and generic users.  In 1916, Judge Cardozo, in the 
seminal tort case MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., confronted the daunting 
question of whether an automobile manufacturer owed a duty of care to an 
injured user of its vehicle with whom it lacked privity.259  In concluding that 
a duty of care was owed, Judge Cardozo articulated several factors that lie at 
the core of duty in negligence:  whether the manufacturer knew “of a danger, 
not merely possible, but probable” that would result from negligent conduct 
and whether it was “reasonably certain” that the defendant’s negligent 
conduct would put “life and limb in peril.”260  By examining such 
considerations—awareness and probability of harm and the nature of the 
injury—the MacPherson court grappled with the context in which the 
litigants’ relationship arose to answer the duty question.261  Likewise, and 
over a century later, MacPherson’s emphasis on context provides a powerful 
justification for recognizing a duty of care between brand-name 
manufacturers and generic users. 
As applied here, the first batch of MacPherson considerations—awareness 
and probability of harm262—cuts for duty in light of the prescription drug 
industry’s distinctive federal regulatory scheme.  Because federal law 
obligates generic manufacturers to adopt the brand-name warning label,263 
the brand-name manufacturer is aware that generic users will suffer harm 
should the label fail to adequately warn of any adverse side effects.  
Accordingly, it is awareness—not mere foreseeability264—that enhances the 
case for duty because brand-name manufacturers know ex ante that 
negligently crafting its own warning labels will inevitably cause physical 
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harm to generic users.265  In addition, the probability of this harm is great266 
because, under PLIVA, brand-name manufacturers are the only ones that can 
unilaterally strengthen drug warning labels.267  Therefore, since the power to 
draft a drug’s warnings label lies exclusively within the domain of the brand-
name manufacturer, the likelihood of harm to generic users is at its maximum 
where the brand-name manufacturer declines to use reasonable care in 
making this label. 
From a more fundamental perspective, holding that there exists no duty of 
care despite the brand’s awareness of impending harm to generic consumers 
cannot be squared with the rest of our legal system, which places a premium 
on knowledge—that is, the mens rea element in criminal law or intentional 
torts like assault and battery.  A colorable argument can even be made that 
this premium on knowledge is a fortiori in tort law.268  Indeed, our legal 
system operates this way because of the bedrock legal principle that 
knowledge of harm generates a legal obligation to avoid causing that harm.  
And history, as embodied in MacPherson, crystallizes this bedrock principle 
by providing the key insight that brand-name manufacturers owe a duty of 
care to generic users because of their awareness of potential harm and the 
near certitude of injury that will befall generic users should manufacturers 
fail to exercise due care.269 
Continuing on, the second MacPherson consideration—the nature of the 
injury270—also cuts overwhelmingly in favor of finding a duty of care.  
Deficient prescription drug warning labels generate risks of injury that are of 
a serious and permanent character.  As evident from the California, Iowa, 
Massachusetts, and West Virginia line of cases,271 defective warnings have 
contributed to palpable harms such as gangrene, tardive dyskinesia, 
respiratory disease, and, of course, death.272  Accordingly, in MacPherson’s 
terms, inadequate brand-name warning labels cast the generic user’s “life and 
limb in peril,” and, thus, this feature of the brand-name, generic-user 
relationship obligates the brand-name manufacturer to use reasonable care 
when crafting its warning label. 
It is also crucial to note that in asking courts to recognize a duty of care, 
the generic user does not seek relief for subservient discomforts under tort 
law, such as emotional distress or economic loss.273  Instead, she seeks legal 
recourse for lifelong harms that—in addition to causing profound physical 
discomfort—can deprive her of her ability to live out her life with dignity.  
On such injuries, our centuries-old common law has clearly spoken:  tort law 
does not turn a blind eye to such harms.  Thus, the real, irreversible, and 
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concrete injuries suffered by the generic user must be actionable under the 
tort of negligence because it is precisely this category of harms that 
MacPherson and enduring tort tradition say that tortfeasors have a duty to 
prevent.274 
The third and final insight that MacPherson provides is the fighting 
message to courts to retain fidelity to doctrine when deciding whether a duty 
of care exists.  This Note concedes, frankly and sympathetically, that the duty 
question in the brand-name, generic-user context is difficult and rife with 
conflicting justifications that courts must grapple with.  But in tackling these 
issues, courts can take comfort in the fact that Judge Cardozo, too, grappled 
with the same difficult questions over a century ago in MacPherson.275  As 
two leading tort scholars remark: 
From a modern perspective, the question [of whether a manufacturer owes 
a duty of care to a product user not in privity] may seem too trivial to merit 
asking, but in Cardozo’s day, it was not quite so easy.  It is now part of our 
ordinary social and moral understanding that businesses which 
manufacture and market products to consumers have certain 
responsibilities to those consumers, and that those consumers have certain 
legitimate expectations of manufacturers.  These sorts of expectations are 
built by the law itself in some measure.276 
Thus, MacPherson tells the tale that courts, in following where tort doctrine 
leads them, can break from current social norms and understandings when 
articulating new duties of care.277  At bottom, though recognizing a duty of 
care between a manufacturer and the consumers of generic equivalents of its 
products may very well seem novel and unintuitive under modern societal 
norms, MacPherson’s core takeaway is that courts are not shackled by social 
intuitions when crafting tort law.278  Indeed, just as MacPherson eradicated 
privity as the defining flavor of negligence law over a century ago,279 so too 
can modern courts shape new understandings and expectations of the 
prescription drug industry by recognizing a duty of care. 
2.  The “Integration” Principle 
In addition to history, the intimate nature of the brand-name, generic-user 
relationship, as furnished by federal law, provides further support for the 
position that a duty of care flows from the former to the latter.  To start off, 
duty opponents are correct in contending that there is no formal relationship 
between brand-name manufacturers and generic users; after all, generic users 
are neither the immediate buyers nor the direct users of the brand-name 
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product.280  Nonetheless, despite the lack of formal privity, a duty of care 
endures because of the close association the brand name and generic user find 
themselves in by virtue of federal law. 
Under the federal regulatory scheme, the brand name’s innovation supplies 
the foundation for producing its generic-drug counterparts:  the generic 
manufacturer is obligated to ensure that its drug has the same physical 
composition and warning label as that of the brand name.281  Consequently, 
this sui generis framework for the prescription drug industry turns the brand-
name manufacturer into a component manufacturer of the generic drug by 
making it the de facto supplier of a constituent part—the intellectual 
property—that is integrated into the final generic product.282  Among other 
things, “intellectual property” here encompasses the brand name’s research 
and development, representations of pharmaceutical safety to the FDA and 
the public at large, and, most importantly, the biochemical composition of 
the generic drug.  The integration of this intellectual property into the generic 
product thus establishes a tight nexus between brand-name manufacturers 
and generic users that is exceeded only by the buyer-seller relationship shared 
by the brand-name manufacturer and its direct consumer. 
To reiterate then, the integration argument states that the closely intimate 
relationship between brand-name manufacturers and generic users is a 
creature of federal law that provides the requisite foundation for finding duty 
by turning the brand name into a component manufacturer of the generic 
drug.  Viewed from this vantage point, a duty of care undoubtedly exists 
because the brand name’s original intellectual property and representations 
of pharmaceutical safety—as integrated into the generic drug—lie at the crux 
of generic users’ failure-to-warn claims.283  Indeed, it is the brand name’s 
pharmaceutical recipe that the generic user comes into contact with and the 
lack of adequate warning accompanying this intellectual property causes 
injury from such contact.  To the contrary, the argument that no duty of care 
is owed because generic users ingest the generic drug, not the brand-name 
drug,284 is unavailing because it focuses on trivial features—the plastic 
exterior enveloping the substance and the commercial identity of the 
manufacturer—that are of no consequence to generic users’ claims.  Their 
 
 280. See, e.g., Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 171 (4th Cir. 1994) 
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liable to generic users.  Although the manufacturer supplies the intellectual property for the 
generic drug, it does not partake in the selling of the generic product, thus precluding the 
application of strict products liability. 
 283. One might also add that the integration argument hits back at the core of the duty 
opponents’ end run argument because, in viewing the intellectual property as a component 
part of the generic drug, the brand-name manufacturer has directly caused the generic user’s 
injury with its product, the intellectual property. See supra notes 156–75 and accompanying 
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 284. See supra notes 156–75 and accompanying text. 
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legal claim is, at its core, not about the generic pill’s physical casing or the 
drug’s commercial name—which are indeed discrepant between brand-name 
and generic drugs—but about the drug’s intellectual property and its lack of 
accompanying warning, both of which are exclusively supplied and 
controlled by the brand-name manufacturer.285  In light of this inextricable 
link, brand-name manufacturers do owe generic users a duty of care. 
Before turning to the public policy discussion, it is worth addressing the 
inherent fairness—or alleged lack thereof—of imposing a duty of care on the 
makers of brand-name drugs.  Opponents can certainly attack this Note’s 
integration argument by contending that federal law’s esoteric framework for 
the prescription drug industry is beyond the brand-name manufacturer’s 
control,286 and thus, it is unfair to impose a duty of care based on this 
rationale.  However, there are two succinct responses that turn this argument 
on its head.  First, duty in negligence law does not turn on fairness but on 
doctrinal considerations as applied to a particular plaintiff-defendant 
relationship.287  And in fact, many duties of care that tort law recognizes or 
rejects can be characterized, to some degree, as inherently unfair:  the duty 
of care owed to trespassers on one’s property,288 the duty of care a Good 
Samaritan assumes upon initiating a benevolent rescue,289 and, conversely, 
no duty on local police to save members of the public.290  Thus, tort doctrine, 
not fairness, draws the contours of duty. 
Second, even if one were to concede that fairness is relevant to duty, 
fairness is inherently unreliable and subject to variation based on which lens 
one uses to view a set of facts.  A brand-name manufacturer faced with a duty 
of care to generic users may very well argue that it is unfair to expose it to 
liability for another competitor’s product.291  At the same time, for the injured 
generic user who has just had her arm amputated because of gangrene caused 
by a generic drug,292 no duty is just as, if not more, unfair because it shuts 
her out from legal recourse.293  Thus, these contradictory views beg the fatal 
question:  Even if fairness enters the duty calculus, what exactly is fairness 
and how do we go about consistently construing it under the duty question? 
 
 285. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2471 (observing that federal law requires generic drugs to 
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 287. See supra Part IV.B. 
 288. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968) (holding that “a man’s 
life or limb does not become less worthy” because he is a trespasser). 
 289. See, e.g., Swicegood v. PLIVA, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1356 (N.D. Ga. 2008). 
 290. See, e.g., Riss v. City of New York, 240 N.E.2d 860, 861 (N.Y. 1968). 
 291. See Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 169–70 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 292. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 558 (2009). 
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2250 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
3.  A Fighting Message to Courts 
As noted above, this Note does not wish to engage in the substantive public 
policy debate coloring the duty question.294  Instead, this Note contends that, 
notwithstanding the veracity of the policy concerns undergirding the no duty 
position,295 courts are institutionally equipped to address these concerns 
because of their core competence in crafting tort law.  Furthermore, this Note 
contends that even if courts do fall short and fallout ensues from their 
recognition of a duty of care, state legislatures and Congress have shown the 
political will and wherewithal to regulate the prescription drug industry.  
Thus, this two-tiered system of defense against the public policy 
considerations at stake provides a safe harbor for courts to experiment with 
and find a duty of care. 
a.  Core Judicial Competence in Crafting Tort Law 
to Prevent Public Policy Concerns 
Courts have the institutional capacity to meet the public policy challenges 
associated with recognizing a duty of care because of their core competence 
in crafting tort law.296  As noted above, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court’s decision in Rafferty is a prime example of such core competence.297 
As discussed in Part II, the Rafferty court came upon a fork in the road 
when it found principle to cut for duty and policy to cut against it.298  But 
instead of treating duty as a zero-sum issue, the court split the baby and found 
duty by applying its core competence in tort law and recalibrating the breach 
element from negligence to recklessness.299  The court’s tweaking of the 
breach element thus kept the policy concerns at bay while providing injured 
generic users an avenue of legal recourse against the more flagrant behavior 
of brand-name manufacturers.300  And in making this judicial adjustment, the 
court was able to remain faithful to tort doctrine while alleviating its pressing 
public policy concerns.301 
Likewise, future courts in deciding this question can follow 
Massachusetts’s remedial approach because all courts share the same core 
judicial competence in crafting tort law.  Furthermore, courts have a wealth 
of options to address public policy issues via negligence claims given 
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negligence’s four-element structure of duty, breach, causation, and injury.302  
Thus, in addition to tinkering with breach, as Massachusetts did, courts can 
recognize a duty of care and address public policy concerns by finessing a 
variety of elements under the tort of negligence. 
For example, courts may limit liability through proximate causation, 
especially if the sequence by which the generic user’s injuries transpire is 
unforeseeable or too attenuated from the brand-name manufacturer’s 
negligent conduct.303  Courts could also finesse the injury element by 
capping the damages ultimately afforded to generic plaintiffs or by making 
actionable only a certain class of injuries.  Finally, courts could ratchet up 
the evidentiary standard from preponderance of the evidence to clear and 
convincing, which would enhance protection for brand-name defendants 
against meritless claims.  Accordingly, these examples make clear that courts 
could retain fidelity to doctrine and recognize duty while simultaneously 
stifling the outbreak of ominous policy consequences.304 
Of course, duty opponents may question what good recognizing duty even 
does if courts can employ alternative ways to limit generic plaintiffs’ ultimate 
recovery.  This argument, however, fails because it misconceives duty and, 
more broadly, tort law, as solely a vehicle for compensation.305  While 
compensation is undoubtedly an important feature of negligence law, it is 
emphatically not its defining characteristic; there is intrinsic value to 
recognizing a duty of care that exists independent of compensating private 
parties.306  For this intrinsic value flows from the empowerment conferred 
upon the injured generic user against her tortfeasor, and the humanistic 
gesture of the legal system in telling the generic user, “I understand and 
recognize the wrong that has been afflicted upon you.”  Duty in negligence, 
thus, is not a means to an end but an end in and of itself, and, accordingly, to 
conceive of duty as merely a question of liability discounts the considerable 
deontic value inherent in it. 
b.  The Political Branches Provide a Safe Harbor 
Courts can also rest assured when finding a duty of care because, should 
palpable policy harms ensue, state legislatures and Congress will step in to 
address those concerns.  Evidence of the political branches’ will and ability 
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to intervene is perhaps most clear from the complex federal regulatory 
scheme,307 supplemented by state regulations,308 that currently governs the 
prescription drug industry.  The complex and comprehensive nature of these 
regulations suggest that the political branches take a keen interest in the 
prescription drug industry and, further, that they do not perceive the common 
law to be the sole arbiter of the industry’s warning-label obligations.  
Successful past tort reform movements also reinforce the notion that state 
legislatures can help out if public policy fallouts result.309  In sum, then, the 
political branches operate effectively as a second line of defense.  Courts 
should therefore take stock of the safe harbor that this provides and recognize 
a duty of care according to the compelling doctrinal justifications presented 
by the brand-name, generic-user context.310 
CONCLUSION 
The duty question embedded in the brand-name, generic-user context is 
one that raises serious concerns and has uncomfortable real-world effects.  
But despite this, courts should not shy away from the task of faithfully 
applying tort doctrine as embodied in history and precedent.  As Justice Felix 
Frankfurter once argued, “the judiciary is jeopardized when courts become 
embroiled in the passions of the day and assume primary responsibility in 
choosing between competing political, economic and social pressures.”311  
No doubt, while endorsing duty requires an abundance of courage in the face 
of colossal socioeconomic pressures, courts should nevertheless do so 
because the doctrine demands that a duty of care be recognized.312  As history 
demonstrates, some of the greatest snippets of tort law—Cardozo’s 
abolishment of privity over a century ago313 and Justice Roger Traynor’s 
introduction of strict products liability314—also required judicial courage at 
their inception.  These instances, in closing, thus reaffirm and underscore the 
core message of this Note:  where tort law says there is a duty of care, courts 
should endeavor to effectuate that duty. 
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ADDENDUM 
As this Note was going to press, a 6-3 majority of the U.S. Supreme Court 
handed down a decision on a federal maritime tort claim that was strikingly 
analogous to the generic users’ claims against brand-name pharmaceutical 
manufacturers analyzed above.  Air & Liquid Systems Corp. v. DeVries315 is 
a self-described federal common law decision that focuses on the duty issue 
in a negligence claim against a product manufacturer.  As described briefly 
below, Justice Kavanaugh’s decision for six members of the Court provides 
strong—albeit indirect—support for the recognition of a duty of care between 
brand-name manufacturers and generic users. 
In DeVries, the defendants had manufactured ship equipment for the U.S. 
Navy, which the Navy later integrated with asbestos products made by third 
parties.316  Many years later, plaintiffs—Navy veterans who had been 
exposed to this integrated asbestos—brought negligence claims against the 
equipment manufacturer, alleging that the manufacturer owed them a duty to 
warn of asbestos’s harmful effects because of the noxious material’s 
foreseeable incorporation into the defendants’ ship equipment.317  In 
response, the defendants argued that they had not manufactured the asbestos 
and, accordingly, could not be held liable for harms flowing from another 
manufacturer’s product.318 
The Court ruled for the injured plaintiffs and held that, in the maritime 
context, a “manufacturer does have a duty to warn [users of the final 
integrated product] when its product requires incorporation of a part and the 
manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the integrated product is 
likely to be dangerous for its intended uses.”319  In so reasoning, the Court 
rejected the defendants’ argument that, because they had not manufactured 
the asbestos itself, the plaintiff must fail on the duty element.320  Moreover, 
the Court rejected the defendants’ public policy arguments against such 
liability.321  In lieu of such considerations, the Court rested its rationale for 
the recognition of a duty on:  (1) the combination of the foreseeability of the 
integrated product and the knowledge that future uses of its product would 
require the inclusion of the asbestos, and (2) economic efficiency, which the 
Court concluded supported duty because of the defendants’ superior position 
to warn of asbestos harms.322 
DeVries strongly supports the proposal defended in the body of this Note:  
clear doctrinal and policy analysis yields a duty of care from brand-name 
manufacturers to generic users in the prescription drug context.  Here, as in 
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the maritime context of DeVries, the brand name “knows or has reason to 
know” that its product—the prescription warning label—will be integrated 
into the generic drug due to the FDA’s mandate requiring integration;323 
furthermore, this integration of the brand name’s warning label and the 
generic drug is required under federal law,324 just as the integration of 
asbestos and the DeVries defendants’ equipment was required for its 
intended use by the Navy.325  Accordingly, the integration rationale 
undergirding the Court’s duty conclusion in DeVries likewise triggers a duty 
of care between brand-name manufacturers and generic users.  Finally, the 
DeVries Court’s economic efficiency justification326—which asks the 
question of who is in the best position to warn—also supports the recognition 
of a brand-name manufacturer duty to generic users:  not only is the brand 
name in the best position to warn of harmful side effects, but it is also the 
only actor in a position to warn given PLIVA’s requirement of warning-label 
sameness.327 
To be sure, the Supreme Court notes that “[m]aritime law has always 
recognized a ‘special solicitude for the welfare’ of those who undertake to 
‘venture upon hazardous and unpredictable sea voyages,’” and the subject of 
this Note is state products liability law, not federal maritime law.328  
Nonetheless, if there were ever an element of state common law designed to 
be solicitous of plaintiffs, it is that involving persons injured by consumer 
products.  As this Note’s introduction aptly observed, the emergence of strict 
products liability in the common law serves as a telltale sign of tort law’s 
solicitude for injured product consumers.  Consequently, it is this Note’s 
view that the Court’s theoretical framework underpinning duty in DeVries 
may carry over and, indeed, furnish a duty of care in the brand-name 
manufacturer, generic-user relationship. 
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